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1.0  Introduction 
We know that infrastructure levels and quality significantly matter for economic growth 
and poverty alleviation. The “infrastructure gap” in Europe (European Economic 
Commission’s statement, July 20151) has been recognized for many years and its negative 
impact on economic growth, job creation and social cohesion is felt across every country 
within the region. Within infrastructure services, the transport sector, and above all the roads 
subsector, is one of the most concerned by the involvement of the private sector: public 
private partnerships (PPPs hereafter) in most of European countries are dominated by road 
projects (PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2004)) and take the form of concession contracts. In these 
contracts, concessionaires undertake the design, building, financing and operation of the 
relevant facility and their main source of revenue are the tolls that they can charge to users for 
the whole length of the concession. They are very long-term contracts (often over 30 years) 
involving large upfront specific investments. These features make them particularly prone to 
opportunistic behaviors and lead contracting parties to design rigid contracts (Williamson 
1985, Spiller 2013). However, there has been some negative feedback, following experiences 
in Latin American (Guasch (2004), Estache (2006)) and developed countries (Chong et al. 
(2006), Engel et al. (2006)). Significant contractual costs, together with difficulties in 
designing and adapting contractual agreements during the contract between public authorities 
and private operators, are often posited to explain this mixed scenario (Spiller (2009), Athias 
(2009), and Athias (2013)). It has often been noted that many agreements are standardized, 
and that “A key concern with long-term PPP contracts is the level of flexibility that they offer 
to authorities to make changes, either to the use of assets, or to the level and type of services 
offered” (PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2005)). One example is given by the conflict that 
occurred in 2014 between the French government and motorway operators. The socialist 
                                                 
1 See http://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/infrastructure/news/2015-07-22-cef-delegation-agreement-
signed_en.htm. 
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government wanted to revise contracts with motorway operators, privatized under the 
previous administration, which it regards as too generous and plans to create a new regulator 
to oversee highway tolls. However, the government's room for maneuver was limited as 
operators were protected by agreements stipulating they must be compensated for any change 
in contracts, which in some cases do not expire until 2035.2 
This paper challenges the view that transport concession contracts are standardized and 
too rigid. We show that such contracts exhibit a large diversity and we argue that this 
diversity can be related to exogenous factors. More precisely, toll road concession contracts 
are characterized by a degree of uncertainty that is much greater than in most ordinary 
contracts. Traffic forecasts are notoriously imprecise, making toll road concessions very risky 
(Trujillo, Quinet, and Estache (2002); Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter (2003); 
Vassallo (2006); Athias and Nunez (2008, 2015)). This aspect of toll road concession 
contracts should call for contractual flexibility so as to adapt the contract once uncertainty 
unfolds, even though contractual flexibility could favor the occurrence of opportunistic 
behaviors. Thus, the design of such contracts is affected by the challenge of including the 
appropriate level of flexibility: too much, and undesirable opportunistic renegotiations are 
likely to occur; too little, and opportunities for welfare-enhancing renegotiations will be lost. 
In this paper, we estimate whether the uncertainty associated with toll road concessions is 
balanced against the standard fear of occurrence of opportunistic behaviors associated with 
long-term incomplete contracts involving specific investments.  
While our paper is mostly empirical, we frame it around a transaction cost economics 
approach of contractual choices. We disentangle between three main determinants of 
contractual rigidity: projects specific uncertainty (for example future traffic uncertainty), 
                                                 
2 See Reuters, December 16, 2014: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/16/us-france-tollroads-
idUSKBN0JU0W520141216. 
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contracting parties’ characteristics (for example connivance between the contracting parties) 
and the quality of the institutional environment (for example government’s capacity to 
commit and quality of governance) characterizing the country in which the project is 
developed. In particular, we highlight that the impact of the institutional environment is 
ambiguous.3 A strong institutional environment might on the one hand increase ex ante 
commitment (the commitment effect, leading to more rigid contracts), and on the other hand it 
might increase the ability of contracting parties to renegotiate contracts without prohibitive 
transaction costs (the governance effect, leading to more flexible contracts). This leads to one 
of the empirical questions that we address in this paper.  
Using an original database consisting of 71 toll road concession contracts from around 
the world, we observe a great variety of provisions for toll adjustment, from extremely rigid 
(such as firm-fixed price provisions in which tolls are fixed for the entire length of the 
concession) to very flexible ones (for example contracts that contain provisions for 
renegotiation that determine ex ante any periodic ex post negotiations of the initial toll 
adjustment provision). Such variety came as a surprise for contracts that are commonly 
considered as being too rigid. Our results indicate that the flexibility of price provision 
increases with the uncertainty associated with future demand; this suggests that when 
uncertainty is high, parties prefer to sign flexible contracts and adapt their future behavior ex 
post through renegotiation rather than anticipating it ex ante in the contractual provisions. In 
addition, we show that there are political drivers involved in the design of toll road concession 
contracts. In particular, those contracts devised with left-leaning procuring authorities are 
likely to be more rigid. This finding strengthens the importance to consider political concerns 
                                                 
3 Obviously, the institutional framework is given on the short run. The quality of the institutional 
environment plays nevertheless a role in the trade-off at stake in contractual choices (Henisz and Willamson 
1999). Because we are using data coming from different countries, we observe variability in institutions and we 
can assess their impact on contractual choices. 
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in the design of PPP contracts. Finally, while the role of institutions on contractual choices is 
often discussed but rarely tested in the literature, our results suggest that contractual choices 
are affected by the quality of the relevant regulatory regime: the better the regulatory regime, 
the more flexible the contracts.  Thus, contrary to common beliefs, we find, overall, that 
economic incentives related to exogenous factors (either related to projects, or contracting 
parties, or institutional characteristics) largely influence contractual choices for toll road 
concession contracts. They are not these -- commonly acknowledged -- standardized and too 
rigid contracts. 
Our paper follows the strands of the literature that focus on the determinants of 
contractual choices. One strand uses agency theory with moral hazard and the main 
contention of this literature is that efficient contractual choices balance the incentives of a 
party against the inefficient risk borne by that party (Tirole (1988), Iossa and Martimort 
(2015)). Higher incentives tend to be assigned to the party that is least risk-averse and has the 
higher marginal productivity in relation to effort. The trade-off generally manifests itself in a 
choice between price cap and cost-plus-oriented contracts. This paper shows that if these 
considerations might be important in the design of toll road concession contracts, other 
considerations related to exogenous factors of contractual incompleteness also matter. This 
paper is then in the same vein as the strand of the literature that analyzes the question of 
contractual choices building on transaction cost economics. But this literature has received so 
far limited empirical evidence (main papers are Crocker and Masten (1991); Crocker and 
Reynolds (1993); Saussier (2000)) and has not considered this specific case of PPP contracts 
between a public authority and a private operator that raises new concerns. This paper is an 
attempt at filling this gap.  
Our paper leads to a set of managerial and policy recommendations for contracting 
officers. If infrastructure contracts usually involve specific investments, rigidifying contracts 
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is not an efficient way to secure such investments. As soon as uncertainty around the 
transaction is important, our results suggest that crafting more flexible contracts is more 
efficient. Furthermore, the institutional framework appears to be important too, as more 
secure institutional frameworks allow contracting parties to design more flexible contracts. 
This might explain why we observe in some countries the decision to make independent 
regulatory agencies in charge of the regulation of toll road concession contracts. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we describe the 
peculiarities of transport concession contracts that influence their contractual design, and state 
our present set of theoretical propositions. In Section 3, we describe the contractual toll 
adjustment processes observed in our data set. In Section 4, we present the original data used 
in the empirical section. Section 5 describes our empirical methodology, together with the 
econometric results obtained. In Section 6, we describe our checks on robustness. Finally, in 
Section 7, we present our conclusions.  
2.0  Economic Issues in Contractual Design of Transport Concession Contracts 
2.1  Peculiarities of Transport Concession Contracts  
To develop their infrastructure, public authorities (central or local authorities) may 
decide to resort either to traditional procurement contracts or to PPPs. The key difference 
between PPPs and traditional procurement contracts is that under PPPs, the private sector 
delivers not only assets but also services for the duration of the contract. Therefore, they are 
responsible for the delivery of assets, as well as for the overall project management and its 
implementation, and its successful operation until the end of the contract. PPPs are thus 
complex long-term projects that involve non-verifiable investments, usually for the delivery 
of complex services, or at least services for which the degree of uncertainty is high. As a 
consequence, contractually unanticipated adaptations of the service provision very often occur 
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after the contract is signed. These observations suggest that the PPP problem is primarily one 
of ex post adaptations rather than ex ante screening.  
The incompleteness of PPP contracts, as described above, also leads to an important 
strand of literature that covers the issue of renegotiation of contracts in less developed 
countries (Guasch (2004), Laffont (2005), Guasch and Straub (2006), Guasch et al. (2008), 
Engel et al. (2009)), as well as in developed countries (Engel et al. (2006), Spiller (2009), 
(Engel et al. (2011); Estache and Saussier (2014)). For example, in a study of more than a 
thousand concession contracts awarded in Latin America during the 1990s, Guasch (2004) 
found that the terms were changed substantially in over 60 per cent of the contracts within 
three years of commencement. In an updated study over the period 2004-2014, Guasch et al. 
(2014) found that 78 per cent of the contracts are renegotiated very soon after their signature. 
Furthermore, in a study of 50 Chilean concession contracts signed between 1993 and 2007 
(mostly road contracts), Engel et al. (2009) revealed that these generated a total of 147 cases 
of unanticipated renegotiations. This strand of the literature identifies the different causes of 
renegotiation, such as adverse selection and lack of commitment (Guasch and Straub, 2006), 
corruption issues (Guasch et al. (2008)), political issues (Guasch and Straub (2006), Engel et 
al. (2009)) as well as third party and accountability issues (Spiller,(2009), Athias (2013)). 
These studies also highlight the effect of contractual choices (such as price cap vs. cost-plus) 
on the probability that renegotiation will be required. In particular, these studies show that 
price cap contracts, which are considered to be rigid contracts, are more likely to result in 
renegotiation (Guasch (2004), Guasch et al. (2008)). This is consistent with recent reports 
from the United Kingdom that suggest that English PFIs are renegotiated extensively because 
the initial agreements were too rigid (House of Commons’ Seventeenth Report Session  
(2010-2012)). However, previous studies on private contracting (e.g. Joskow (1987) on long-
term coal contracts; Bajari and Tadelis (2001) on procurement) found that designing rigid 
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contracts is an effective way of reducing the likelihood of renegotiation. Such contrasting 
findings suggest that one specificity of transport concession contracts is that more rigid 
contracts do not impede renegotiations and that contractual completeness and contractual 
rigidity are different, the latter not leading systematically to lower renegotiations. This 
dimension is of high importance when deciding on the level of flexibility or rigidity of 
transport concession contracts.  
In fact, the design of the process of contractual compensation in infrastructure 
concession contracts is not regulated, i.e. there are no rules that determine the set of allowable 
toll adjustment processes. Concession contracts are most often awarded under an open 
bidding procedure, usually in two stages. In the first stage, private consortiums submit their 
technical qualifications, following the rules defined by the public authority concerned. In the 
second stage, the qualifying consortiums, i.e. those consortiums selected at the end of the first 
stage, are allowed to bid for the concession. The concession is then awarded to the consortium 
with the best bid (sometimes there is an additional stage between the second stage and the 
selection of the best bid, in which the two best bidders are asked to submit their Best and 
Final Offers in a final stage). Most toll road concession contracts are awarded via lowest-bid 
auctions, with adjudication criteria that include the lowest toll, the lowest public subvention 
requirement, and the shortest concession. When the best offer has been selected, there is then 
the so-called “preferred bidder phase”, during which the public authority negotiates the final 
terms of the contract with the preferred bidder. During this phase, the public authority and the 
private operator have the opportunity to make the contract more rigid or more flexible through 
negotiation. This feature of the award process for toll infrastructure concessions introduces 
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reputational considerations into the determination of contractual terms, making the study of 
such contracts of particular interest4.  
 
2.2  Propositions 
 Considering the above mentioned peculiarities of transport concession contracts, we 
herein adopt a transaction cost perspective to explain how contracting parties design price 
provisions in such contracts (Williamson (1985)). This theoretical framework recognizes that 
contractual agreements are inherently incomplete (because of bounded rationality issues) and 
that renegotiation is always an issue, whatever the efforts of the contracting parties to rigidify 
the contract.  
We postulate that to realize the transaction, the contracting parties may sign two types 
of incomplete contract:   
- A rigid contract, in which contracting parties attempt to specify the means of 
coordination according to future states of nature. In other words, in such a contract, the parties 
try to prevent renegotiation, essentially by deciding the price to be charged by the private 
operator for the entire duration of the contract. However, in line with evidence provided in the 
previous section, we believe that the contracting parties cannot commit not to renegotiate, 
even if the contracts are rigid.  
- A flexible contract, in which the parties do not try to avoid renegotiation, so they 
plan to renegotiate price once any uncertainty unfolds.  
                                                 
4 Reputation is not a perfect guarantee. A firm that is well reputed at the date of contract signature may be 
completely different within a few years. However, the probability for this to happen is lower compared to the 
situation in which the contract is signed with a bad reputation firm. Good reputation firms have more to lose in 
behaving opportunistically during renegotiations and might procure a better service quality compared to other 
firms (Spagnolo (2012)). 
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 The literature on transaction costs suggests that the contracting parties are less likely 
to design rigid contracts when the level of uncertainty is high (Crocker and Masten (1991), 
Crocker and Reynolds (1993)). The contention is that maladaptation costs are a function of 
uncertainty, so as uncertainty increases, it is more likely that the rigid contract would be 
poorly specified.  
A further set of predictions that emerges from this theoretical framework concerns the 
magnitude of the renegotiation costs. The theory suggests that the higher the renegotiation 
costs, the more likely the contracts are to be rigid. The straightforward empirical implications 
involve differences in the contracting parties’ characteristics, as well as differences in 
institutional environments. In fact, the costs of ex post adaptation are a function of the 
willingness (or lack thereof) of the contracting parties to enter into conflict, haggling and 
friction. Thus, when the parties decide to devise a flexible contract, each party must account 
for the likely behavior of the other, because some renegotiation will inevitably be necessary 
later on. Therefore, reputation, as it is perceived at the date of signature, is an important factor 
in reducing the probability of high ex post renegotiation costs. Furthermore, differences in 
political ideology (whether public authorities are left- or right-wing) may affect the 
contractual choices. Left-wing public authorities tend to be more skeptical than their right-
wing counterparts when delegating public services to private operators, and they therefore 
may be less cooperative. Lastly, the institutional framework may affect the renegotiation 
costs. Indeed, the existence of weak institutional frameworks, in which the probability of 
successful opportunistic behavior is high, implies the possibility of higher renegotiation costs, 
which lead to rigid contracts (Spiller (2009)). Conversely, strong institutions may frame ex 
post renegotiations, and reduce their costs; this is termed the governance effect of institutions. 
However, institutional frameworks also have an impact on the probability of renegotiating a 
rigid contract (Laffont (2005), Guasch et al. (2008), Estache and Saussier (2014)). The 
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contention is that weak institutional frameworks are more likely to lead to flexible contracts 
(such as when the reliability of contract enforcement is weak) because a rigid contract may be 
effective only when the contracting parties perceive a relatively high probability of 
enforcement. There is no point in signing a rigid contract if it is obvious that it will be 
renegotiated; this is termed the commitment effect of institutions. The overall impact of the 
institutional environment on contractual rigidity is therefore unclear. A strong institutional 
environment might, on the one hand, increase ex ante commitment (the commitment effect, 
leading to more rigid contracts); and on the other hand, it might increase the ability of the 
contracting parties to renegotiate contracts without prohibitive transaction costs by providing 
an efficient structure of governance for renegotiations (the governance effect, leading to more 
flexible contracts). This leads to an empirical question that is addressed later on in this paper. 
This investigation is possible because our data set is not limited to one country but instead 
includes contracts signed within different institutional environnements. 
3.0  Toll Adjustment Processes in Infrastructure Concession Contracts 
 In order to investigate toll adjustment provision choices in toll road concession 
contracts, we compiled a dataset that consisted of 71 toll road concession contracts (highways, 
bridges, tunnels). These 71 contracts included 45 original contracts and 26 renegotiated 
contracts, referred to as “supplemental agreements”. These supplemental agreements 
correspond to non-anticipated, agreed modifications to the original contracts concerned, and 
the fact that these entailed the creation of new and different arrangements between the parties 
make it possible to consider them as new contracts (See Crocker and Reynolds (1993) for a 
similar methodology). The majority of projects in the sample (76 per cent) are French, with 
the remainder being contracts in Greece, the United Kingdom, Canada, Portugal, Benin, Chile 
and Thailand. The contracts were devised with a range of different operators. The oldest 
contracts in the sample were implemented in 1970, and the latest in 2005.  
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3.1  Toll Adjustment Types 
 We now turn our attention to the detail of the toll adjustment processes used in our 
sample as summarized in Table 1. We argue that toll – or price – adjustment processes can 
broadly be divided into two categories, rigid and flexible ones, according to whether the price 
for the whole length of the concession is the result of pre-specified compensation formulas or 
the result of future negotiations between the private operator and the public authority. 
 
3.11 Rigid Adjustment Processes  
 Among the rigid adjustment processes, the most stringent is the “firm-fixed price” 
contract (FFP), in which price is specified to be independent of future events. FFP contracts 
are rarely used in infrastructure concessions, however, as a result of the high degree of 
uncertainty involved in them. More common are the automatic provisions that adjust tolls 
periodically, according to a predefined formula. The most extreme, rigid form in this category 
is a definite escalator (DE), that adjusts tolls according to an explicit, predefined schedule, 
increasing tolls, for example, at a specified rate. Some parties have also devised DE contracts 
that provide greater flexibility, by allowing the concessionaire a predefined margin around the 
adjusted price (DE/MARG). In contrast, fixed-price with economic price adjustment (EPA) 
contracts attempt to relate contract tolls to market conditions as they unfold. The process of 
compensation is formulaic, and the equation used ties the tolls to market data such as the 
consumer price index or specific indices of labor or materials. In practice, the flexibility of 
such a contract depends upon the number and importance of the indexed categories. For this 
reason, we have distinguished between those contracts that use fixed-price with partial 
economic price adjustment, which use the consumer price index to determine tolls according 
to an agreed compensation formula (FP/CPI), and those that use a fixed-price with economic 
price adjustment, which use cost indices (FP/COST). In both cases, implementation remains 
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straightforward, while the tolls become more flexible. However, as mentionned above, the 
requirement that the contingencies and compensation formulas be explicitly pre-specified 
constrains the flexibility of such contracts. The possibility for the concessionaire to be 
guaranteed a fixed minimum increase in price using a predefined escalator (FP/EPA/DE), or 
to have a predefined margin around the adjusted price (FP/EPA/MARG), or a traffic variation 
indexation (FP/EPA/TRAFFIC) in the compensation formula, does not eliminate these 
drawbacks, even if it provides greater flexibility. These first eight price adjustment processes 
are sufficiently rigid to work without any external intervention. They are clearly rigid toll 
adjustments that take account of maladaptation costs in order to avoid ex post renegotiation.  
3.12 Flexible Adjustment Processes  
 Some parties have also devised adjustment provisions such as not-to-exceed price 
(NTEP). NTEP is specified at the outset and the concessionaire must negotiate with the public 
authority the determination of a firm price at or below this ceiling. NTEP contracts are thus 
not purely automatic adjustment processes, in that the final price is the result of negotiation, 
but neither do they contain renegotiation provisions in that the contracting parties do not 
specify ex ante the periodic negotiation of the toll adjustment process. In addition, in all the 
contracts that resort to this NTEP adjustment, the toll ceiling is loosened by indexing the tolls 
to the consumer price index (NTEP/CPI) or to pre-specified cost indices (NTEP/COST). 
Parties have also devised contracts that have a not-to-exceed-price with economic price 
adjustment – CPI or COST or both – that either ensure the concessionaire a fixed minimum 
increase of the NTEP through a predefined escalator (NTEP/DE/EPA), or an indexation to 
traffic variation (NTEP/TRAFFIC/EPA), or a margin of prices (NTEP/EPA/MARG). The 
most flexible option in this category affords the concessionaire the total freedom to determine 
and impose tolls over a ten-year period, and then establishes a NTEP with adjustment via 
indexation to cost indices for the remainder of the concession (FREE/NTEP/COST). Some 
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parties in our sample have also devised renegotiation provisions (RENEG) that consist in 
determining ex ante periodic ex post negotiations of the initial adjustment process. The parties 
thus periodically take into account the full range of relevant information before reaching 
agreement on the toll. These provisions therefore afford the transaction a considerable degree 
of flexibility. Nevertheless, the parties may structure the negotiation process by, for example, 
defining in the contract the sequence of offers and acceptances, or specifying the defaults if 
agreement cannot be reached. 
These last seven adjustment processes explicitly pave the way for ex post negotiation 
and the final agreed price is then the result of negotiation between the private operator and the 
public authority. They are all clearly flexible toll adjustments. 
The toll adjustment processes are summarized in Table 1. Such a wide range of price 
provisions is somewhat surprising in view of the fact that in the literature it is often claimed 
that one of the main drawbacks of concession contracts is their rigidity 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2005)). 
3.2  Toll Adjustment Types and Contractual Rigidity 
 The description of the toll adjustment processes found in our sample of contracts 
suggests that it is possible to rank toll adjustment provisions not only according to two broad 
categories (rigid vs. flexible) but also according to a more continuous qualitative index of 
rigidity. The most rigid contract in this regard is clearly the FFP, which permits no toll 
adjustment at all. When escalated by a predefined adjustment or by an economic price 
adjustment tied to the consumer price index, or to the realized costs of important inputs, the 
contract is less rigid, although still more rigid than NTEP contracts, and the different 
variations on these, which afford the concessionaire a greater degree of flexibility in 
determining tolls according to the actual context, but also provide substantial scope for 
opportunism. Nevertheless, the upper bound restrains the most opportunistic redistributive 
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strategies, in contrast to renegotiation adjustments, which nevertheless do permit the parties to 
take full advantage of the most up-to-date information.  
The tables (Table 2) indicate then the ranking of the price adjustment processes used in 
the empirical part of our study, where lower numerical values correspond to less rigid 
contracts. We have decided to classify our contracts in three different ways. In the first 
classification, we consider that toll adjustment processes are either rigid or flexible (binary 
variable), according to whether the price for the whole length of the concession is the result of 
pre-specified compensation formulas or the result of future negotiation between the private 
operator and the public authority. Table 3 indicates that 53% of our contracts are rigid. In the 
second classification, we consider that toll adjustment provisions can be classified according 
to an increasing index of 5 types of rigidity. In the third classification, we consider an 
increasing index of 11 types of rigidity. Using these three classifications, the robustness of our 
results may be demonstrated according to the way the adjustments are classified.5  
4.0  Determinants of the Toll Adjustment Processes 
 In this section, we present our explanatory variables and discuss how these are related 
to our propositions. The definition of our variables is presented in Table 3.  
4.1  Project Characteristics 
 The existence of uncertainty may affect contractual choices, especially through its 
impact on the expected maladaptation costs. One of the primary sources of uncertainty that 
face contracting parties during negotiations over a road concession contract is the difficulty of 
forecasting future traffic flows with any confidence. This uncertainty about future demand 
may be more or less important depending on the context of the project. In order to quantify 
this uncertainty in traffic flow, we surveyed a set of managers of a French private 
                                                 
5 Types 1 & 2 contracts of Table 2 are never renegotiated in our data set; type 3 are 50% renegotiated; 
type 4 are 60% renegotiated and type 5 are 62.5% renegotiated. This reinforces us in the quality of our ranking in 
5 classes of rigidity. 
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concessionaire, asking them to rate the uncertainty surrounding the traffic flows for each 
project. We interviewed these managers only in relation to the contracts in which their own 
companies were involved (in France and outside France), either because the company won the 
contract or because it participated in the bid. It is also important to note that the interviewees 
all had more than 15 years of experience and were well able to remember how they assessed 
the uncertainty surrounding traffic flows in the project before the project was launched (some 
old records of their traffic forecasts still exist for each project). In fact, when negotiating a 
contract, the parties have expectations about the degree of uncertainty in these forecasts likely 
to be experienced during the course of the exploitation phase. We capture this uncertainty in 
the explanatory variable TRAFFIC, which corresponds to the average rating (between 1 and 
5) given by the managers to the uncertainty of predicted traffic flows in every contract. We 
checked that the respondents gave consistent answers to all the questions, and undertook 
further probing if there was any inconsistency. The hypothesis is that increasing uncertainty in 
traffic flows, as reflected by an increase in the rating given by the managers interviewed, 
should lead to more flexible contractual arrangements.  
Another important source of uncertainty stems from the difficulty of predicting future 
economic conditions with any confidence. We capture the increasing uncertainty associated 
with long time horizons in the variable DURATION, which is defined as the number of 
months between the completion of the infrastructure and the end of the concession. The 
hypothesis is that a longer duration increases the uncertainty and hence the costs of 
implementing more rigid contracts, leading to more flexible arrangements.  
4.2  Characteristics of Contracting Parties 
 In relation to the magnitude of the renegotiation costs, those cases where contracting 
parties previously worked together on other projects may give an indication of reputational as 
well as learning effects (Gil and Marion (2013)). Repeated contracting helps partners to 
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develop specific procedures and common frameworks that may help to adapt and renegotiate 
contracts over time, with less argument about what must be done when the environment is 
subject to change. We capture this effect in the variable REPEATED CONTRACT, which 
accounts for the number of former interactions between the concessionaire and the public 
authority in question. 
In addition, differences in political ideology (that is left- or right-leaning public 
authorities) may affect contractual choices. Left-leaning public authorities are generally more 
skeptical than right-leaning ones about the delegation of public services to private operators. 
This means that private concessionaires may have a better reputation among right-wing public 
authorities. At the same time, private operators anticipate that they may be more likely be 
expropriated when the procuring authority is left-leaning. We may therefore expect that 
contracts negotiated with left-wing authorities are likely to be more rigid. We capture this 
effect in the dummy variable LEFT.  
4.3  Institutional Environment 
 In recent years, international institutions have developed numerous aggregate indicators 
of governance. To capture the reliability of contract enforcement, we used the aggregate 
indicator REGULATORY QUALITY, developed by the World Bank6.  This indicator 
measures the capacity of the government to formulate and implement policies. More 
precisely, it includes measures of the incidence of policies that are market-unfriendly, such as 
price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the enforceability of 
contracts and the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as business 
development. This variable might then reflect not only the probability of seeing the contract 
enforced (the commitment effect) but also the fact that renegotiation is less costly (the 
                                                 
6 We carried out regressions using all the six indicators developed by Kaufmann, et al. (2004) and all the 
results were similar. 
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governance effect), all other things being equal. Therefore, as we already discussed, the 
expected sign may be positive or negative, depending on which of these effects dominates.  
4.4  Control Variables 
 In addition, we include several control variables in the regressions. Firstly, in our 
sample of contracts, we have 71 contracts that include 45 original contracts and 26 
renegotiated contracts, referred to here as “supplemental agreements”. As pointed out 
previously, we consider these supplemental agreements to be new contracts (following 
Crocker and Reynolds (1993)). We allow for the possibility that these contracts are specific 
by using the dichotomous variable SUP AGREEMENT.  
The ability of the procuring authority to negotiate price provisions depends also on the 
number of bidders. The hypothesis is that the availability of alternative suppliers increases the 
negotiating power of the public authority during the preferred bidder phase, leading to the 
adoption of more rigid contracts. Thus, we include the explanatory variable NUMBER OF 
BIDDERS.  
Furthermore, in our sample of contracts, there are private and semi-public 
concessionaires. We therefore use the binary variable SEMI PUBLIC as an additional control 
variable.  
Because our dataset consists mainly of French contracts, we deal with a possible 
specific ‘French’ effect using the dummy variable FRENCH in our specifications.  
Finally, we incorporate the variable LEARNING, defined as the number of former 
contracts of the public authority with private concessionaires (data collected from the 
scientific and professional press), to capture a learning effect of public authorities. We also 
introduce a trend variable (TREND), corresponding to the year of signature of the contract, to 
capture a potential evolution over time of practices, as well as two binary variables in order to 
capture an effect due to the type of public authority (national vs. local authority - LOCAL 
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AUTHORITY) and a potential operator fixed effect for contracts managed by the operator 
that is the most represented in our dataset (OPERATOR)7. The variables used in our 
regressions are summarized in Table 3.     
5.0  Empirical Methodology and Results 
5.1   Methodology 
We herein use the following probit model, which estimates the probability of choosing a 
flexible contract: 
𝐹𝑖 = 1[𝐹𝑖∗ = 𝑥𝑖 𝛼1 + 𝑧𝑖𝛼2 + 𝑇𝑖𝛼3 + 𝑒𝑖 < 0] 
where 1 is the indicator function, which takes a value of 1 whenever the statement in 
brackets is true, and 0 otherwise;  𝐹𝑖 is the binary variable that indicates whether concession i 
is controlled through a flexible contract or through a rigid one; 𝐹𝑖∗  is a latent variable; 𝑥𝑖 is a 
vector of characteristics of the project, of the contracting parties and of the institutional 
environment; 𝑇𝑖 is the year of signature of concession i, 𝑧𝑖 is a vector of additional control 
variables;  𝑒𝑖 is the error term; and 𝛼1, 𝛼2, and 𝛼3  are the vectors of the parameters that 
correspond to 𝑥𝑖, 𝑧𝑖, and 𝑇𝑖 respectively.  
Because we believe that it is also of interest to consider contracts as devices that lie on a 
continuum between being totally rigid and totally flexible, we also performed ordered logit 
estimates taking into account the fact that contracts can be ranked from very rigid to very 
flexible, using our classifications in 5 and 11 groups (see Table 2)8.   
                                                 
7 We have several operators involved in our data set of contracts. One of them accounts for 66% of our 
contracts.  
8 In this case, it is not possible to use an ordinary least squares model because it imposes cardinality on 
the ordinal variables TYPEADJUST5 and TYPEADJUST11. Using an ordered probit model, we consider the 
relationship 𝐹𝑖∗ = 𝑥𝑖𝛼1 + 𝑧𝑖𝛼2 + 𝑇𝑖𝛼3 + 𝑒𝑖 with (𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛), where 𝐹𝑖∗ is an unobserved latent variable, 
(𝑥, 𝑧, 𝑇) is a set of explanatory variables and 𝑒 is a random disturbance. If we consider that 𝐹𝑖∗ is in our case the 
price provision rigidity level of concession 𝑖, we cannot observe 𝐹𝑖∗ directly, but we can observe a category 𝑗, if 
𝜇𝑗−1 ≤ 𝐹𝑖∗ ≤ 𝜇𝑗. The use of an ordered probit model results in estimates of the thresholds as well as of the 
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5.2  Results 
 The results are shown in Table 4. We report fewer observations than there are in our 
whole dataset because data on the number of bidders were not available for two of the 
contracts and data on duration were not available for concession contracts awarded through 
Present-Value-of-Revenue auctions9.  
Model (1) represents our probit model (Rigid vs. Flexible). We present the results with 
all the independent variables we can include in the regression10.  The second set of estimates 
is based on our classification of toll adjustment types in 5 and 11 groups, using an ordered 
probit (Models (2), (3), (4) and (5)). Firstly, we present results using the same set of 
explanatory variables as Model (1) (in Models (2) and (3)). We then present results using the 
whole set of explanatory variables (Models (4) and (5)). We also add for each classification 
(Models 6 and 7) the results we would have obtained if our dependent variable had been 
continuous rather than discrete - to check the robustness of our results - using OLS (See 
footnote 7).  
Our results suggest that the uncertainty of traffic flow is clearly an important variable 
for all the models (at the 1 percent significance levels), and drives the choice of toll 
adjustment type. More specifically, the higher the traffic uncertainty, the more flexible the toll 
adjustment provision. This result confirms that the higher the probability of a rigid contract 
being maladapted ex post, the higher the probability that a flexible contract will be used. 
                                                                                                                                                        
distance between them. The use of an OLS model exogenously assigns both. Nevertheless, we provide the two 
types of estimates to check the robustness of our results. 
9 These auctions differ from auction mechanisms where the public authority sets a fixed concession term 
and firms bid using toll values. Indeed, under a Present-Value-of-Revenue auction, bidders compete on the 
present value of the toll revenue they require to finance the project. The concession ends when the present value 
of the toll revenue is equal to the concessionaire's bid. Thus the concession term is undefined. For a precise 
description of such an auction mechanism, see Engel et al.  (1997). 
10 It was not possible to add all our explanatory variables, especially some of our control variables, 
because of empty cell problems - i.e. some of our control variables predict our model perfectly. 
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Regarding the characteristics of the contracting parties, our variable LEFT is significant 
regardless of the specification chosen, and is positively correlated with the use of rigid 
contracts. This may reflect the fact that left-leaning authorities are generally rather reluctant to 
enter into a contract with private operators for public services, leading them to try to secure 
everything ex ante by signing rigid contracts. This finding runs counter to a recent study by 
Levin and Tadelis (2010), in which the authors find that there is little correlation between 
voters’ broader political preferences and the contracting practices used, and recommend 
further investigation of the political drivers involved. 
We also find a significant correlation between the rigidity of the toll adjustment 
provision and the institutional environment. In particular, our measure of the reliability of 
contract enforcement is negatively correlated with the rigidity of the contract concerned. In 
other words, the stronger the institutional environment, the more flexible the toll adjustment 
provisions. As previously discussed, efficient institutions may reduce the probability of seeing 
the contract renegotiated (hence providing an incentive to the parties to devise rigid 
contracts), but it may also be responsible for reducing the cost of renegotiations (hence 
providing incentives to the parties to devise flexible contracts). Our results suggest that it is 
the latter effect that prevails, i.e. strong institutions constitute an important impediment to the 
opportunism of contracting parties during renegotiation phases, thereby leading to flexible 
contracts.  
Finally, turning now to our control variables, we observe that the number of bidders 
impacts positively and significantly on the probability of adopting a rigid contract. The 
availability of alternative suppliers increases the rigidity of the contractual agreements used. 
The results also show that we may observe an impact from the type of the concessionaire, i.e. 
private or semi-public, on the toll adjustment provision selected. The fact that the 
concessionaire is a semi-public company appears to make the contract more rigid. A simple 
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explanation in our case is that semi-public concessionaires do not try to negotiate more 
flexible contractual terms, because they have the same interests as the public authority. The 
identity of the private partner concerned may also be important. Our variable OPERATOR, 
which takes a value of 1 when the private operator concerned is the most represented in our 
dataset, suggests that some operators might be more associated with rigid forms of contract 
than others. The fact that this variable is positive and significant might indicate that the most 
represented operator is sufficiently important to partially impose his view, pushing for more 
rigid contracts compared to other operators. 
The results that relate to the other explanatory variables are less significant, depending 
on the specification selected. Thus, the REPEATED CONTRACT variable is not always 
significant, depending on the specification used. Nevertheless, the sign is consistently 
negative, which suggests that any increase in the number of former interactions between the 
contracting parties will decrease the rigidity of the selected toll adjustment provision. As 
previously discussed, this result may reflect the fact that past interactions between the same 
partners may be characterized by their experience and ability to communicate with each other, 
and hence to adapt through renegotiation without conflict. In some specifications, we observe 
a learning effect that leads to the adoption of more rigid contracts. In other words, the more 
public authorities are used to contract out public services, the more they rely on rigid 
contracts. This might reflect the fact that (1) they have learned how to contract and hence their 
contracting costs are lower and (2) they have learned where future maladaptation costs may 
originate, thereby encouraging them to adopt rigid contracts. Furthermore, supplemental 
agreements do not seem to represent specific agreements, because the dichotomous variable 
SUPAGREE is not always significant, and may have a different sign depending on the 
specifications used. This is partly consistent with the results obtained by Crocker and 
Reynolds (1993). Finally, French contracts, which are over-represented in our dataset, seem to 
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be characterized by a fixed effect since our FRENCH variable is significant in some of our 
estimates. We explore this in details in what follows.  
Our other control variables do not seem to help to explain contractual choices. In 
particular, our TREND variable, the aim of which is to capture the temporal evolution of 
contractual practices, is not significant.  
Overall, our main results are twofold. First, we show that contract flexibility is 
increasing with uncertainty associated with future demand. Second, our results highlight the 
fact that contractual choices are impacted by the quality of the regulatory regime. More 
precisely, the inability to commit leads to more rigid contracts, implying that the governance 
effect of a strong institutional environment prevails over its commitment effect.  
6.0  Robustness Checks 
 For a variety of reasons, our results remain subject to limitations. One of the limits of 
our previous regressions is that the contract duration may be endogenous. Indeed, there is a 
potential correlation between DURATION and the error term, caused by the omission of two 
types of variables: the characteristics of the contracting parties (operators’ characteristics), 
and those of the contracts themselves (regional characteristics other than political ones). The 
regional unobserved factors are technological or political in nature, while the operator-
specific ones relate in particular to his renegotiating skills, and so on. Although we have 
already allowed for fixed effects related to the region and the operator, we go a step further by 
devising two instruments, both of which are correlated with the decision to sign a long-term 
contract, but not with the type of toll adjustment used. These instruments are the average 
contract duration observed with the same operator in different regions (instrument 1), and the 
average contract duration in different regions (instrument 2). They are valid because the 
correlation between the choice of contract duration for a project with a particular operator in a 
given region is correlated with instrument 1 through certain aspects that by virtue of its 
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construction, are independent of particular regional aspects. In a similar way, the choice of 
contract duration is only correlated to instrument 2 through aspects that by virtue of its 
construction are independent of effects specific to both the region and the operator. We 
obtained an OLS estimate of the variable DURATION, which we wished to instrument for. 
Note that these preliminary estimates are fairly satisfactory (see Model (8) in Table 5). We 
test for the exogeneity of the contract duration under scrutiny in our Models (1) to (7) (in 
Table 4), using the Rivers and Vuong (1988) approach, which simply consists in running the 
standard probit estimation augmented by the residuals of the first stage estimates (see also 
Wooldridge (2002)). The test largely fails to reject the exogeneity of duration, suggesting that 
endogeneity is not an issue in this case11.  The p-values for the Rivers-Vuong test are in the 
last row of Table 4.  
Another issue that arises from our previous results is the fact that our dataset is mainly 
comprised of French contracts. We have dealt with a possible specific French effect using the 
dummy variable FRENCH in our previous specifications. Nevertheless, in order to go a step 
further, we present estimates based on a subsample of French contracts (Models (9) to (11) in 
Table 5). As with the previous estimates, we performed a Rivers-Vuong test for each 
specification. When the exogeneity of the contract duration can be rejected (Model (9)), we 
estimate the equations using the above instrumented variables in two stages. Because we 
performed the two stages separately, we needed to adjust the standard errors in the second 
stage. We present the bootstrapped standard errors for the instrumental variables (IV) 
estimations (Model (10)). The results of the robustness checks are presented in Table 5. 
                                                 
11 We ran two-stage least squares regressions using the instrumented variable DURATION. This had no 
effect on the results given in Table 5. The results are not provided in this paper but are available on request. 
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The results are mainly confirmed, lending a degree of confidence to our results, 
although we do note minor differences specific to the French subsample12. 
7.0  Conclusion 
 Herein, we have studied the contractual design of toll adjustment provisions in road 
concessions. Adopting a transaction cost economics approach, we have presented the most 
important trade-offs between contractual flexibility and rigidity for such contracts. We 
indicate that contractual design varies mainly according to the relative magnitude of the 
maladaptation and renegotiation costs and the probability of contract renegotiation, 
highlighting the fact that no single type of contractual design is always dominant.  
Our empirical work provided evidence that the provisions of toll adjustment in 
infrastructure concession contracts show significant diversity, a finding that has not been 
previously demonstrated. This really does call into question the common belief that PPPs are 
only ever rigid contracts. In addition, our empirical results lend a significant degree of support 
to our main predictions. We found that contracts that are characterized by a high degree of 
uncertainty in the traffic flow forecasts are likely to be less rigid, and we also provided 
evidence that the characteristics of the contracting parties affect the design of the contract. In 
particular, those contracts devised with left-leaning procuring authorities are likely to be more 
rigid. Those results are in line with previous literature studying contractual complexity 
(Crocker and Masten, 1991; Crocker and Reynolds, 1993; Masten and Saussier, 2000; 
Saussier, 2000). However, previous studies are not that many and did not study the specific 
case of contracts between a public authority and a private operator that raises new concerns. 
More importantly, we provided strong evidence that the quality of the institutional 
environment has an effect on the design of the contract, which has never been tested to our 
knowledge.  
                                                 
12 Our regulatory quality variable is no longer significant because we are focusing on the French 
subsample with little variance over the period considered. 
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Those results suggest managerial and policy recommendations. When uncertainty is 
high, instead of making efforts during negotiations to rigidify the contract in order to secure 
specific investments that have been made, contracting parties should invest in crafting flexible 
contract anticipating future renegotiations. Furthermore, when operating in different 
countries, private operator should adapt their contractual practices to the institutional 
environment the contract will be embedded in. In terms of policy, our results suggest that the 
existence of a stable and efficient regulatory framework might reduce transaction costs for 
contracting parties, leading them to adopt more flexible contracts with less fear of 
opportunistic behaviors during renegotiations. This might explain why in some countries, 
such as France, governments have decided that toll road concession contracts henceforth will 
be regulated by an independent regulatory agency.13 Those recommendations are not specific 
to toll road concessions but can be extended to every concession or public private partnership 
that needs large specific investment to be made. Future work on the role of the institutional 
framework on contractual choices would be useful to better understand its influence. 
  
                                                 
13 The Macron Law, voted on July 9th 2015 —named after its chief architect, French Economy Minister 
Emmanuel Macron—is designed to peel away layers of red tape that have strangled the country’s economic 
growth and will extend the objectives of the ARAF agency (agency regulating transport by rail) to the control of 
highways concession contracts (ARAF will then change its name to ARAFER). 
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Table 1: Toll Adjustment Types 
Type Negotiated Ex Ante Negotiated Ex Post 
 Firm-fixed price (FFP) Price No negotiation ex post 
 Definite escalator (DE) Price, escalator Only adjustment to price 
according to an explicit 
predefined schedule 
 Definite escalator with a margin 
(DE/MARG) 
Price, escalator, margin Only adjustment to price 
according to an explicit 
predefined schedule with the 
flexibility afforded by a 
predefined margin 
 Fixed price with partial economic price 
adjustment (FP/CPI) 
Price, Economic price adjustment 
formula based on the consumer price 
index 
Only formulaic adjustment to 
price as specified ex ante 
 Fixed price with economic price 
adjustment (FP/COST) 
Price, Economic price adjustment 
formula based on specific labor or 
materials indices 
Only formulaic adjustment to 
price as specified ex ante 
 Fixed price with EPA and with a definite 
escalator (FP/EPA/DE) 
Price, Economic price adjustment 
formula, definite escalator 
Only formulaic adjustment to 
price as specified ex ante and 
according to an explicit 
predefined schedule 
 Fixed price with EPA and with a margin 
(FP/EPA/MARG) 
Price, Economic price adjustment 
formula, margin 
Only formulaic adjustment to 
price as specified ex ante with 
the flexibility afforded by a 
predefined margin 
 Fixed price with EPA and with traffic 
variation indexation (FP/EPA/TRAFFIC) 
Price, Economic price adjustment 
formula, traffic indexation 
Only formulaic adjustment to 
price as specified ex ante and 
to traffic variation 
 Not-to-exceed price with partial 
economic price adjustment (NTEP/CPI) 
Ceiling price, Economic price 
adjustment formula based on the 
consumer price index 
A firm price at or below the 
ceiling 
Not-to-exceed price with economic price 
adjustment (NTEP/COST) 
Ceiling price, Economic price 
adjustment formula based on specific 
labor or materials indices 
A firm price at or below the 
ceiling 
 Not-to-exceed price with a predefined 
escalator and an economic price 
adjustment (NTEP/DE/EPA) 
Ceiling price, definite escalator, 
Economic price adjustment formula 
A firm price at or below the 
ceiling 
 Not-to-exceed price with a traffic 
variation indexation and an economic 
Ceiling price, Traffic variation 
indexation, Economic price 
A firm price at or below the 
ceiling 
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price adjustment (NTEP/TRAFFIC/EPA) adjustment formula 
 Not-to-exceed price with economic price 
adjustment and with a margin 
(NTEP/EPA/MARG) 
Ceiling price, Economic price 
adjustment formula, Margin 
A firm price at or below the 
ceiling 
 Freedom during ten years and then 
NTEP/COST (FREE/NTEP/COST) 
Ceiling price, Economic price 
adjustment formula based on specific 
labor or materials indices 
A firm price at or below the 
ceiling after ten years 
 Renegotiation Adjustments (RENEG) Initial automatic adjustment process, 
Frequency of renegotiation 
A firm price 
 
 
Table 2 : Dependent Variables (11 groups & 5 groups) 
 
 TYPE Freq. Mean      
 1 if RENEG 3 6,28      
 2 if FREE/NTEP/COST 10       
 3 if NTEP/EPA/MARG 10    TYPE Freq. Mean  
 4 if NTEP/TRAFFIC//EPA 3    1 if RENEG 3 3,42  
 5 if NTEP/DE/EPA 3    2 if FREE/NTEP/COST 10   
 6 if NTEP/COST or NTEP/CPI 4    3 if NTEP 20   
 7 if FP/EPA/MARG 10    4 if FP 30   
 8 if FP/EPA/DE 2    5 if DE or FFP 8   
 9 if FP/EPA/DE 12       
 10 if FP/COST or FP/CPI 6       
 11 if DE or DE/MARG or FFP 8       
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Table 3: Variables Definition and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Definition  
RIGID 71 0.53 0.50 0 1 1 if the contract belongs to groups 7 to 11 
(See Table 2)  
TYPE OF 
ADJUSTEMENT (5 
GROUPS) 
71 3.42 1.01 1 5 Ranking of toll adjustment types in 5 
groups (See Table 2)  
TYPE OF 
ADJUSTEMENT (11 
GROUPS) 
71 6.28 3.28 1 11 Ranking of toll adjustment types in 11 
groups (See Table 2)  
TRAFFIC 71 2.39 1.14 1 5 Average rating on uncertainty of traffic 
flow  
LEFT 71 0.31 .46 0 1 1 if the procuring authority is a left-wing 
authority; 0 otherwise  
REPEATED 
CONTRACT 
71 5.27 4.21 0 11 Number of former interactions between 
the concessionaire and the public 
authority  
LEARNING 71 6.78 4.59 0 16 Number of former contracts of the public 
authority with private concessionnaires  
DURATION 68 396.44 183.07 60 1164 Number of months between the 
completion of the infrastructure 
construction and the end of the 
concession  
REGULATORY 
QUALITY 
71 1.03 0.31 -0.48 1.82 Rating obtained by the country in 
question regarding this governance 
dimension (Source: World Bank)  
SEMI PUBLIC 71 0.21 0.41 0 1 1 if the concessionaire is a semi public 
company; 0 otherwise  
SUPAGREE 71 0.46 0.50 0 1 1 if the contract is a supplemental 
agreement; 0 otherwise  
NUMBER OF 
BIDDERS 
69 1.67 1.24 1 5 Number of bidders for the contract  
LOCAL AUTHORITY 71 0.29 0.45 0 1 1 if the concedant is a local authority  
OPERATOR 71 0.66 0.47 0 1 1 if the concessionnaire is the operator 
that is the most frequent in our database  
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Table 4 : Estimation Results 
 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dep. Variable RIGID 5 GROUPS 11 GROUPS 5 GROUPS 11 GROUPS 5 GROUPS 11 GROUPS 
Sample Whole Whole Whole Whole Whole Whole Whole 
Estimator Probit Ord. Probit Ord. Probit Ord. Probit Ord. Probit OLS OLS 
TRAFFIC -6.801*** -1.272*** -1.063*** -1.380*** -1.183*** -0.414*** -1.386*** 
 (2.559) (0.326) (0.225) (0.359) (0.248) (0.124) (0.413) 
REPEATED 
CONTRACT 
-0.948** 
(0.375) 
-0.104 
(0.078) 
-0.124* 
(0.068) 
-0.069 
(0.094) 
-0.119 
(0.074) 
-0.012 
(0.034) 
-0.179* 
(0.103) 
DURATION -0.013*** -0.002** -0.002* -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
LEFT 1.848** 1.340*** 1.293*** 1.425*** 1.374*** 0.435** 1.475** 
 (0.894) (0.508) (0.405) (0.518) (0.433) (0.172) (0.583) 
REGULATORY 
QUALITY 
-3.471*** 
(1.322) 
-3.284*** 
(1.146) 
-1.975** 
(0.918) 
-5.389*** 
(1.368) 
-3.784*** 
(1.082) 
-1.659*** 
(0.331) 
-3.863*** 
(0.930) 
FRENCH 0.922 -3.470** -3.514** -3.538* -3.523 -1.243* -2.856 
 (1.430) (1.617) (1.713) (1.926) (2.176) (0.685) (1.881) 
SUPAGREE -1.447** 0.340 -0.309 1.045*** 0.345 0.283** -0.014 
 (0.618) (0.330) (0.305) (0.398) (0.325) (0.136) (0.387) 
LEARNING 0.451** 0.338* 0.300 0.327* 0.268 0.115* 0.355** 
 (0.180) (0.182) (0.186) (0.173) (0.173) (0.060) (0.169) 
TREND 0.025 -0.066 -0.029 -0.099 -0.054 -0.033 -0.073 
 (0.056) (0.051) (0.049) (0.065) (0.063) (0.024) (0.077) 
NBBIDDERS    0.792** 0.781*** 0.258** 0.771** 
    (0.345) (0.295) (0.112) (0.356) 
SEMI PUBLIC    3.604*** 3.424*** 0.978** 4.468*** 
    (1.072) (0.966) (0.366) (1.332) 
OPERATOR    2.168*** 1.879** 0.645* 1.887 
    (0.782) (0.810) (0.356) (1.199) 
LOCAL 
AUTHORITY 
   0.083 
(1.631) 
0.061 
(1.613) 
0.017 
(0.510) 
1.733 
(1.561) 
INTERCEPT -22.350     71.189 157.628 
 (110.297)     (47.673) (155.192) 
r2/pseudo r2 0.84 0.58 0.36 0.66 0.42 0.86 0.87 
N 68 68 68 66 66 66 66 
Rivers-Vuong 
Test: p-value 
 
0.22 
 
0.87 
 
0.70 
 
0.35 
 
0.61 
 
0.58 
 
0.61 
Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 5 : Results of Robustness Checks 
Model (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 Dependent Variable DURATION GROUP 5 GROUP 5 GROUP 11 
 Sample / Estimator Whole / OLS French / Ord. Probit French / Ord. Probit French / Ord. Probit 
 TRAFFIC 20.948 -1.268** -1.082** -1.060*** 
 (32.106) (0.559) (0.535) (0.348) 
REPEATED CONTRACT 0.746 -0.353** -0.261** -0.144 
 (10.326) (0.175) (0.123) (0.132) 
DURATION  -0.001*  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.003) 
DURATION (IV)   -0.005  
   (0.042)  
LEFT 17.329 2.314*** 2.539*** 1.619*** 
 (50.080) (0.720) (0.939) (0.565) 
REGULATORY QUALITY 33.825 -3.442 -3.775 -4.297* 
 (105.036) (2.457) (2.360) (2.209) 
 SUPAGREE -30.394 2.419*** 2.471** 0.655* 
 (54.495) (0.740) (1.019) (0.363) 
LEARNING 1.814 0.130 0.090 0.034 
 (16.757) (0.299) (0.309) (0.270) 
TREND 3.746 -0.080 -0.067 -0.042 
 (6.613) (0.089) (0.083) (0.086) 
NBBIDDERS 60.240* -0.016 0.799 0.510 
 (25.788) (0.640) (0.619) (0.635) 
SEMI PUBLIC -343.737*** 10.050*** 8.859*** 4.032*** 
 (94.637) (1.691) (1.432) (1.053) 
OPERATOR  2.795*** 1.760*** 1.965* 
  (1.065) (0.665) (1.098) 
LOCAL AUTHORITY -272.641* -1.804 -3.704 -1.088 
 (139.648) (2.170) (2.880) (1.833) 
INSTRUMENT1 0.284***    
 (0.099)    
INSTRUMENT2 5.658    
 (4.271)    
INTERCEPT -9518.197    
 (13277.188)    
r2 0.55 0.67  0.47 
N 66 53 53 53 
Rivers-Vuong Test: p-value  0.025  0.52 
 
Significance levels: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
